Within Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit we find two radically opposed versions of the human confrontation with natural death, and while neither is able to counteract death's power to erase us, Hegel's text allows us to evaluate the way each appears ethically. While in Hegel's section on Life he gives us a complete account of what natural death entails for the living, we see in these later sections of the Phenomenology that what matters in the human encounter with death, so it seems, is how our confrontations with natural death may or may not constitute our relationship to human life more generally. Death's power to erase us persists, in other words, and yet the power of the self-conscious community in relation to death seems to have ethical significance regardless.
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In this essay, I will thus be analyzing Hegel's account of our consignment to oblivion at the hands of natural death, and I will be juxtaposing ways in which Hegel describes human beings grappling with the threat of this oblivion through the tools afforded by the achievement of a self-conscious community. The essay itself will thus consist in an extended analysis of Hegel's section on Life, followed by an analysis of the human engagement with natural death as it occurs in the stages of the Ethical Order and Absolute Freedom and Terror. Having diagnosed both the threat of natural death for the self-conscious individual and having identified two versions of the self-conscious confrontation with this threat, Hegel's Phenomenology enables us to evaluate PhaenEx these multiple versions of the human engagement with natural death in terms of how we might want to understand them ethically. The following essay is thus framed by my contention that the human engagement with natural death, though historically situated in each of its modes, can become a question for us, and further by my suspicion that how we answer this question has important ethical significance for how we treat one another.
Before proceeding to the analysis of the text, it is perhaps worthwhile to at least mention how the issue of the mortal exposure of the individual in the Phenomenology has framed certain trajectories of continental philosophy in the 20 th century. One of the most significant thinkers in this regard is Theodor Adorno. His critical reorientation to the text is designed to remind us that, throughout the development of Spirit, the frailty of human life never goes away. Understanding -Spirit‖ as the totality of labour, Adorno writes:
… idealism becomes false when it mistakenly turns the totality of labor into something existing in itself, when it sublimates its principle into a metaphysical one, into the actus purus of spirit, and tendentially transfigures something produced by human beings, something fallible and conditioned, along with labor itself, which is the suffering of human beings, into something eternal and right. (23) For Adorno, the threat of idealism is that it can occlude our ability to see the concrete individual in his or her toil and suffering as standing behind or beneath what emerges as the seemingly effortless self-expression of human society and culture. If the name -idealism‖ gathers those perspectives that track the trans-individual accomplishments of human creativity and selfawareness, the worry is that the products of this creativity and self-awareness cover over and/or justify the human suffering upon which they may depend. Adorno and others have thus asked whether Hegel's Phenomenology is complicit with a modernity that has sacrificed the ethical relevance of the concrete human individual in his or her exposure to mortality and to suffering. Arcades 471). 1 For Horkheimer, it is not possible to redeem the murders of the past, and to claim to be able to do so is theological. If Benjamin thematizes a way in which we might confront death so as to address the crimes inflicted upon the individual by an oppressive history, Horkheimer speaks to the fact that the erasure of the individual by death wins no matter what, and hence that the murders of the past are beyond our reach.
For myself, I would like to hold out the possibility that there may indeed be a revolutionary chance to fight for the oppressed past as Benjamin imagined it, but that this will depend upon the degree to which our engagements with the erasures of death go hand in hand with our treatment of the living. If the way we confront death is in some way constitutive of how we treat one another, then even the failed attempt to retrieve the concrete individual from the oblivion of death is ethically significant. Hence, while Horkheimer may be right that the past cannot be redeemed, the lives of those around us may be at stake in the way in which we approach this irredeemability. Through my analysis of Hegel's account of natural death, and likewise of the two versions of the human confrontation with natural death that Hegel presents, I hope to introduce the possibility that how we engage with death is ethically relevant, and that this is the case even if the slain are really slain.
Life as Self-Repose
In Hegel's account of Life in the Phenomenology of Spirit, it appears as a whole emerging from out of the dynamism of the living things within it. The very notion of -Life‖ names certain material processes that comprehend all living things within them and within which living things occur as internal differences. As such, -Life‖ refers to the apparently infinite or indefinite unity to which living things belong, and this belonging is disclosed by living things in their dynamic coming to be and passing away through one another.
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In describing Life, Hegel makes use of the mathematical image of axial rotation and of time as having the stable shape of space. 3 Life is thus an emergent pattern that resolves out of the -restlessness‖ of its internal differences. These differences are then that which Life as an overall process supersedes and/or reabsorbs. The internal differences of Life are thus in constant motion,
while Life itself appears as a stable whole.
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The internal differences of Life are nothing other than living things. As a result, the ontological status of living things as discrete, singular beings is complicated by the way in which they are constitutively a part of Life. What, then, are the trans-individual processes that constitute Life? From the evidence that
Hegel provides we can identify the process of reproduction, on the one hand, and of consumption, on the other. The trans-individual patterns of continuity and flow out of which living things come to be and pass away are thus the processes according to which living things produce each other from out of themselves, and according to which living things consume what is external to them in order to sustain themselves. The opening of living things onto that which exceeds them through the processes of reproduction and consumption gives the lie to each living thing's assertion of its self-standing separateness and being-for-self. This constitutive opening thus comes to be through the conduit of these two essential life processes.
For Hegel, the nature of reproduction as trans-individual is to be a process by which living things come to be passively and from out of material continuity with other living things, but likewise, in coming to be living things immediately take over their being actively. As Hegel writes, -Life in the universal fluid medium, a passive separating-out of shapes becomes, just by so doing, a movement of those shapes‖ (Phenomenology 107/141). This is to say that while living things are not the cause of their own coming to be, they are nevertheless beings that are actively self-moving and self-relating.
To survive as the being that it is, the living thing must oppose its immediate and undifferentiated absorption into Life, and this must take place even though the living thing remains in any case internal to Life as one of Life's moments. According to Hegel, then, the living thing -comes forward in antithesis to the universal substance, disowns this fluent continuity with it and asserts that it is not dissolved in this universal element‖ (Phenomenology
107/141). What Miller translates as -fluent continuity‖ is -Flüssigkeit und Kontinuität‖
(107/141), hence it is the fluidity and continuity of Life that the independent shape must -disown.‖ Within this context, the fluidity at stake is nothing other than the flow between one generation and the next, and hence the flow that makes possible the continuation of Life despite the finitude of individual living things. 7 The living thing asserts that it is not dissolved [aufgelöst] in the universal element, even though it emerges from of this universal element through the fluent process of reproduction.
The self-assertion of the living thing against its continuity with Life is performed for 
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Hence through activity on the part of beings that have in the first instance their own survival as their objective, Life emerges as a phenomenon with a dynamic but stable shape. As self-directing and self-relating -differences‖ internal to Life living things inadvertently engage with one another through the processes of reproduction and consumption so as to produce the image of Life's self-repose.
By drawing an analogy between the classical idea of the -moving image of eternity‖ and the structure of the emergent image of Life as a whole, Hegel determines a position for living things within Life according to which the individual events of their coming to be and passing away do not register as changes to the shape of Life as self-repose. Just as time appears as the stable shape of space through the eternal patterned motion of the solar system, Life is a stillness for which the events that constitute the reality of living things are not eventful. 12 In this way, the cycling of mortal generations through the process of reproduction, and the cycling of matter through the process of consumption appear within the image of Life like the regular motions of the heavens-temporal events that in their regularity achieve the stable shape of the non-event.
Another way of putting this would be to say that Life appears as something that essentially does not change, even though it consists in internal differences that are themselves finite and mortal. Since living things are directly exchangeable and replaceable in relation to one another, the shape of Life as compared with any future or past version of itself is essentially the difference that makes no difference. From the perspective of Life as self-repose, no individual shape is of consequence as such, and the living thing is of no consequence apart from its momentary participation in Life's self-maintenance. Life as dynamic self-repose is thus antithetical to the individual living thing insofar as the living thing would be uniquely relevant. To the contrary, when we view the living thing in terms of its immersion in Life, that living thing is disclosed as a semi-stabilized moment in the flow of mortal generations and in the flow of the exchange through consumption of organic matter, rather than as a uniquely determinate and irreplaceable being in its own right. Life's self-repose is predicated in this regard upon the living thing's coming to be and persisting, but also upon the living thing's ultimate exchangeability and replaceability, and hence upon the erasure of the living thing as a unique event of being.
Life's Bacchanalian Revel
To say that the coming to be and the passing away of living things are non-events in Life is not to say that these singular events are irrelevant. They are necessary, but only as essentially repeatable. In this regard, no particular birth or death is significant as such or in its uniqueness, but each appears as if it is indistinguishable from every other and as if it is capable of seamlessly taking another's place. Cumulatively, then, these indistinguishable events add up to the selfrepose of Life, such that Life appears as a dynamically self-perpetuating process through their effects.
In the Preface of the Phenomenology, Hegel presents us with a similar figure of -simple repose‖ constituted by the coming to be and passing away of its internal differences. This is the figure of the Bacchanalian revel-Hegel's image for truth, for reality, and for the basic narrative structure of the Phenomenology. Hegel's account of the revel is as follows:
The True is thus the Bacchanalian revel in which no member is not drunk; yet because each member collapses as soon as he drops out, the revel is just as much transparent and simple repose. Judged in the court of this movement, the single shapes of Spirit do not persist any more than determinate thoughts do, but they are as much positive and necessary moments, as they are negative and evanescent. separates out or establishes itself as a distinct and determinate formulation, it is just as easily dissolved back into the movement of truth as a moving, transforming process. The overall motion achieves self-repose despite its internal differences through the resolution, the Auflösung, of the internal differences-an Auflösung, or dissolution, that occurs following the moment in which each sich absondert, or in which each separates into its own self-standing autonomy.
Thus the Bacchanalian revel is a self-repose that, like Life, emerges out of the restless movement and perpetual coming to be and passing away of its internal differences. Gerhard
Bolte refers to the revel as an image of -Die wahre Substanz,‖ and writes that -Die wahre (14) [-The true substance is the absolute movement itself, the calm center within the alternating richness of its manifestations that it as a simple totality carries freely inside itself‖-author's trans.]. According to Bolte, the differences are unified through their very movement. The revel refers to Substanz, and Substance is precisely the absolute movement consisting in the unity of two seemingly incompatible aspects-a calm center that takes shape through constant restlessness.
Substanz ist die absolute Bewegung selber, ruhendes Zentrum im wechselnden Reichtum ihrer Erscheinungen, den sie als einfache Totale frei in sich trägt‖
The consequence for the internal differences within this movement is that they are able to maintain their determinacy only provisionally. In this regard, Heinz Röttges describes the revel as a matter of the dissolution of identity-what in terms of Life would entail the dissolution of the being-for-self and self-standing of the living thing, and hence that of its being-alive. For Röttges, then, the vanishing of the specific individual is itself the stillness of the Wine-god.
The disappearance of the individual's identity and the transparent stillness of the god are one and the same Reflexion in sich.
It is in this regard that the movements of Spirit and of Life are structurally alike. Robert
Brandom makes this connection in his discussion of the revel when he writes:
The integrity of the ongoing affair is maintained, however, for as soon as one participant has fallen exhausted and immobile beneath the table, beyond further participation-a concept showing itself inadequate and unsustainable, the commitments it incorporates accordingly dissolvingits place is taken by another, fresher reveler bringing renewed (although still temporary) vigor to the fête … The Concept, like the organism, is not to be identified with its constituents at some time-slice of its career, but with the process by which those elements fall away and are replaced.
According to Brandom, the falling away of the exhausted participants of the revel, or likewise the dissolving of the commitments of the concept revealed in its insufficiency, are homologues to the passing away of living things. Similarly, the emergence of another series of revelers who refresh and renew the revel is homologous to the renewal of the shape of the genus in the birth of a fresh generation. Brandom's use of the notion of -organism‖ is thus not simply metaphorical.
While truth is a -Bacchanalian revel in which no member is not drunk‖ and within which there is -just as much transparent and simple repose‖ (Hegel, , Life in its -self-repose‖ is -an absolutely restless infinite‖ in which -the differences of the movement are resolved [aufgelöst]‖ (106/140). Revelers are reabsorbed as quickly as they drop out because they collapse from drunkenness, finite ideas are reabsorbed as soon as they come forward because their grounding epistemologies -collapse,‖ or are surpassed, by other ideas, and individual living things -collapse‖ as soon as they separate because they are intrinsically fated to death and transformation via consumption and to death and replacement via reproduction. In each case, and hence with regard to the revel, to truth, and to Life, the relative infinity of the whole is not opposed to but rather predicated upon the finitude of the individual shapes within it.
The status of the ephemeral, internal differences vis-à-vis these processes is thus ambiguous in its own right. Hegel writes with respect to the revel that they are -as much positive and necessary moments, as they are negative and evanescent‖ (Phenomenology 27-28/46-47).
Such negativity and evanescence indicates that the moments are lost, and yet their positivity and necessity entails that these moments have a claim to being in any case. for him his own infinitude.‖ In this regard, the relevant change is from -infinity‖ to -his own infinitude‖ such that existence in all its infinite manifestations is internal to the god from which it issues. Hegel also changes -Seelenreiches‖ to -Geisterreiches,‖ which Donald Phillip Verene reads as the difference between -this realm of spirits‖ to -the whole realm of the soul.‖ As Verene points out, this modification changes the site of the location of creation to within the World-master himself. According to Verene:
God's relation to the forms of his creation is that of fellow sufferer. Although his being is that of the true infinite, he suffers the quest to make actual and determinate all the moments within His infinite. (7) Speaking in this regard, as Verene does, as though Spirit were an active being in its own right, Spirit's differences are internal to itself, and they come to be and pass away as a part of Spirit's self-development. According to such a reading, Spirit suffers the passing of its internal differences as it labours to complete the exhaustive manifestation of all its dimensions. But even if we were to regard Spirit as a completely dependent phenomenon that never actually acts and consists only in the collective activity of individual living things, Verene's analysis would still hold insofar as it underscores the fact that the constituents of Spirit are necessary despite being ephemeral. The differences internal to Spirit come to be and pass away, but they are also essential dimensions of the absolute, and their timely manifestation is essential for the absolute's development. Spirit's internal shapes are necessary as ephemeral, and so they have a claim to being, even though this claim is eventually and necessarily revoked. They are essential not in their specificity or uniqueness, but rather as constituents of the actualization of Spirit. Nevertheless, a critical difference obtains between the structure of truth described by
Hegel as the Bacchanalian revel and the structure of Life. This difference becomes apparent when Hegel writes of the revel:
In the whole of the movement, seen as a state of repose, what distinguishes itself therein, and gives itself particular existence, is preserved as something that recollects itself, whose existence is selfknowledge, and whose self-knowledge is just as immediately existence.
(Phenomenology 27-28/46-47)
The individual shapes of truth that come to be and pass away are preserved insofar as they are recollected. The implication, then, is that truth is the memory of what has passed or of what has been negated or refuted. In this regard, truth is a tomb of the different moments constitutive of the whole but which no longer exist as such. Truth is the preservation of the memory of the dead, or it is where the shapes internal to it that have passed away are retained insofar as their havingbeen must be explicitly recalled and acknowledged for this trans-temporal reality to be transparent to itself.
According to Edith Wyschogrod, then, -[m]emory functions to make that which was
mere externality a possession of Spirit‖ (98). 16 Recollection grants particular existence to the individual shapes of truth of the revel so that these become essential dimensions of the manifest self-knowledge of the process as a whole. In this way, the revel describes the dynamic structure of the Phenomenology, since the Phenomenology is also a self-developing whole within which determinately negated stages are recalled as essential developmental moments. The
Phenomenology could thus be read as a narrative through which recollection of determinately negated elements enables the gradual achievement of perfect self-transparency for Spirit as Absolute Knowing.
There is thus a kind of recovery from death in the form of recollection that takes precedence in the Phenomenology, since it is through such recovery that Spirit moves in the direction of self-knowledge. In the development of Spirit, the return from death of those shapes What we find at the stage of the Ethical Order, therefore, is a confrontation with natural death that is in part a matter of the degree of consequence afforded to the passing of the individual. That the individual as a living thing in Life could nevertheless be regarded in its passing as loss and that the individual could be sufficiently differentiated from other living things so as not to be simply replaceable are proof of the accomplishment of a self-conscious community. Importantly, then, the reassertion on the part of the Family of the being-for-self of the dead individual does not reverse the individual's inevitable dissolution in death. What it does do is assert that the individual's disintegration in the face of death counts as eventful passing and as loss for the Family, and hence for those who remain alive.
In this regard, reassertion of the individual in opposition to the disintegrating and absorptive forces of Life becomes available and relevant only at the stage of the Ethical Order because of the high degree of sociality that characterizes this moment of Spirit. This stage of sociality is marked by the ability to have the death of another, and this means to constitute death as marked passing to another by marking the event of passing as an event of real loss. Something is being granted to the dead, in other words, or as Hegel states:
… individuality passes over into this abstract negativity which, being in its own self without consolation and reconciliation, must receive them essentially through a real and external act. (271/333)
Trost und Versöhnung. Consolation and reconciliation. These can only be granted in the face of death through an actual (wirkliche) and external (äußerliche) act of the Family. Sociality enables the reclamation of the individual from reabsorption not because it grants to living things an escape from passing away or from the threat of reabsorption, but because it represents the organization of a multiplicity of mortally vulnerable-yet-self-conscious living things whose individual deaths do not implicate one another, and whose deaths do not all occur (hopefully) at the same time. To be able to be granted death, therefore, one must have survivors, which is to say, one must be a part of a community of individuals who will grant this death and who do not all perish together. When we grant one another this death, we are expressing to one another and ourselves that each of us counts as essentially unique, irreplaceable, and grievable.
Absolute Freedom and Terror
In the Ethical Order, the threat to the self-conscious individual that his death will be of no more significance than the death of any living thing is counteracted by the self-conscious action 4 Robert Pippin has a different interpretation of this image. Following Aristotle's notion that to be alive is to be imbued with the principle of self-motion, Pippin argues that the eternity of Life, compared by Hegel to the -pure movement of axial rotation‖ (106/140), indicates that Hegel is attributing to Life this dimension of self-motion. Pippin then connects this notion of selfdetermination with subjectivity, and hence reads Life as describing the subject of desire in its most basic form as a living thing and its desire. See Pippin (150).
5 As Hegel explains in his nature lectures, it is the strength of the unity of the living thing that distinguishes it as an organism. According to Hegel, -[c] hemistry in its effort to reach what is simple thus destroys individuality. If the individual thing is neutral like a salt, then chemistry succeeds in exhibiting its sides separately, since the unity of the differences is only a formal unity which alone is destroyed. If, however, the thing to be decomposed is an organic being, then not only do we destroy the unity but also the organic nature we wanted to know‖ (Philosophy of Nature 107). Hegel makes a similar point in his discussion of Life in his lectures on aesthetics when he writes -a hand, if severed, loses its independent subsistence; it does not remain what it was in the organism; its mobility, agility, shape, colour, etc., are changed; indeed it decomposes and perishes altogether. It was sustained in existence only as a member of an organism, and had reality only as continually brought back into the ideal unity‖ (Aesthetics 121).
6 According to Stewart, -this continuity in the object sphere [i.e., Life] is broken by activity of objects [i.e. living things] in the external sphere that set them apart from the continuity‖ (118). The third stage, according to Stewart, is the reassertion of Life's continuity with itself through the recognition that the activity of these internal shapes is likewise simply the activity of Life, since it is all activity that takes place within and through Life as a universal medium (see 119-120). 7 Hegel refers to the conflict between the individual living thing and the emergent phenomenon of the genus in his nature lectures when he writes, -[a]s an individual, the living creature is a manifestation (Erscheinung) of the genus, but it is also in conflict with the genus which manifests itself through the destruction of the individual‖ (Philosophy of Nature 279).
9 All living things consume, just as all living things are consumed whole or in part by other living things. Certain living things consume at the boundary between the living and the nonliving. Called autotrophs, these organisms turn inorganic matter such as sunlight, water, or sulfur into the organic matter of their own bodies. They are then consumed by other living bodies, and hence they provide an inorganic foundation for our ecosystems. In many cases, their inorganic diets are supplemented with matter derived from living things.
10 As Hegel explains in his nature lectures, -[t]hrough this process of assimilation, therefore, the animal becomes in a real way for itself; for by particularizing itself into the main differences of animal lymph and bile in its behaviour towards the individual thing itself it has proved itself to be an animal individual; and by the negation of its other, it has posited itself as subjectivity, as real being-for-self‖ (Philosophy of Nature 404).
11 According to Claus-Autur Schleier, there are four levels according to which to view the phenomena of Life and the living thing: -1) einfache Kontinuität, 2) bestehende Gestalt, 3) Prozeß der Gestalten und 4) Gattung,‖ although Schleier also states that only numbers 2 and 3 are spoken about explicitly. It is the process of the shapes (i.e. 3)-or of living things-that produces the genus (i.e. 4), and hence that reconciles the opposition between the simple continuity of Life (i.e. 1) and the distinct separateness of living things (i.e. 2) (Schleier 100). The story of Life for Schleier is thus the story of the emergence of the genus out of the movement of the shapes. The only significant limitation of this view is the exclusive mention in Schleier of the process of reproduction. As we shall see in what follows, the benign self-repose of Life is also a function of the trans-individual process of consumption.
12 Life's eternity need not be static. What matters at this level are not the differences between particular forms of living things, but rather the existential conditions out of which all living things emerge. Regardless of the genus, living things are produced through the perpetual flows of reproduction and consumption, and they all share in being conatively self-relating and yet finite and ephemeral beings. 
